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Information, increasingly, is everywhere. Machines gather information, process it, and automatically communicate it,
often in terms humans understand. Bots tweet on Twitter; Fitbits communicate a user’s activity record; Project Tango
devices render 3D maps; and IBM’s Watson can now argue. With algorithms increasingly writing, drawing, and even
debating, a central question for regulators, courts, and scholars is to what extent the First Amendment protects speech
generated by algorithms. If algorithmic communication falls within First Amendment coverage, regulators will have a
more difficult time governing it. But if it does not, courts will need to explain how the exclusion can sit comfortably with
First Amendment theory and current doctrine.
Stuart Minor Benjamin positions the puzzle of algorithmic speech as part of a larger project in understanding First
Amendment jurisprudence and its expansion and contraction. In previous work, Benjamin has asked how hard it would
be to expand First Amendment coverage; in Algorithms and Speech, he asks how hard it would be to narrow the
existing jurisprudence to exclude a practice that would otherwise be covered. Benjamin recognizes the potential
regulatory consequences of First Amendment coverage of algorithmic speech. But he surveys Supreme Court caselaw
and concludes that there is no principled way to exclude many algorithmic communications from speech protection
without excluding much other communication that we deem squarely within the First Amendment’s coverage.
Algorithms and Speech does valuable work in laying out the current state of expansive First Amendment doctrine, and
in identifying the Supreme Court’s reluctance to create new exceptions. Benjamin also clarifies that the coverage of
algorithmic speech is not just a matter of making analogies to earlier media. Search engine results may be like editorial
decisions, the claim of Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk’s 2012 white paper, but Benjamin is intent on finding an
underlying reason why both are covered that goes beyond structural similarities.
The touchstone of First Amendment coverage, according to Benjamin, is the sending of a substantive message.
Benjamin points out that when a sendable and receivable message has actually been sent, the Supreme Court has
never found that message to be outside First Amendment coverage (a point that is historically untrue, but correct within
current jurisprudence). Excluding algorithmically generated speech would upend existing First Amendment caselaw,
requiring either the drawing of arbitrary lines or the exclusion of much of what is currently considered to be speech.
Benjamin explains that the arguments against covering algorithmic speech, such as distinguishing it as corporate
speech or commercial speech, would also leave core First Amendment institutions such as newspapers unprotected.
What is most important to Benjamin is consistency, and the article is admirable in trying to craft rules that apply equally
to all.
Benjamin carves out several important limitations. First, an algorithm that does not communicate a substantive
message will not be protected. Second, because Benjamin hinges First Amendment protection on the communication
of a message (but interestingly, not its receipt), some companies may have to indicate that they are editors. Third, as is
the case with newspapers, laws of general applicability such as labor laws, tax laws, and most antitrust laws can apply
to algorithmic speakers with no First Amendment ramifications. The government just can’t ban or compel substantive
communication.
Benjamin makes a convincing case for the protection of search engine results under current First Amendment doctrine.
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The recent SDNY decision in Zhang v. Baidu, where a district court judge found First Amendment protection for
Baidu’s search results, shows that judges are likely to agree. The article is also painstakingly honest in trying to
maintain the cohesiveness of the Court’s First Amendment reasoning. But by positioning the question of algorithmic
speech within current jurisprudence and around the model of search engine results, Benjamin limits the scope of the
article in several ways. Algorithms and Speech does important work and will likely be a foundation that others will build
on, but it leaves several more difficult questions for another day.
Benjamin steers away from reasoning from First Amendment theory. He instead navigates the “guideposts” of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, accepting Cass Sunstein’s assertion that the First Amendment in practice is
incompletely theorized. This leads to an unstated bias towards the jurisprudential status quo. It’s not clear precisely
why preserving the guideposts of current jurisprudence is the right approach. The primary explanation offered is that
disturbing the status quo of jurisprudence will threaten other media that more clearly rest at the heart of First
Amendment interests.
We may soon be at a stage, however, where upending existing First Amendment caselaw is to some extent inevitable.
If algorithmic speech does get full First Amendment protection, how will the intent requirements in many of the
categories of unprotected speech get implemented? And if algorithmic speech does not get protection, how will we
distinguish that content from human speech without threatening many of the values underlying the First Amendment?
Algorithms and Speech takes a fascinating first step, while in its caselaw-driven approach leaving a number of
important questions on the near horizon.
The second way in which the article is less daring that it could be stems from the model Benjamin chooses for
algorithmic speech. The search engine model—of an algorithm running according to its programmers’ general
intent—runs the article into limitations right where the questions get most interesting. Benjamin’s touchstone for First
Amendment coverage, based on the Spence test, is the intentional communication of a substantive message by a
human being. When the algorithm is no longer a tool for its user, but an artificial intelligence, Benjamin suggests the
connection to a human speaker might become sufficiently attenuated that First Amendment coverage might no longer
be appropriate. The problem is, as Bruce Boyden has pointed out, that the line between tool and independent message
generator is exceedingly difficult to draw.
The flurry of scholarship around algorithmic speech shows the variety of ways a First Amendment problem can be
framed: with a focus on the speaker, the message, the medium, or the listener. Benjamin’s focus is in large part on an
intentional speaker. The recipient of a message matters to Benjamin to the extent that the recipient can identify the
speaker as communicating a message, but the intentional speaker is for Benjamin the core of what turns information
into First-Amendment-relevant speech.
Robert Post has taken a different approach to First Amendment coverage, explaining that First Amendment protection
extends to a medium of communication because of its status as a social practice (both Tim Wu and Andrew Tutt have
applied this to search engines). The question is whether certain kinds of algorithmic speech are sufficiently like
protected media or have acquired enough of their own cultural meaning to deserve protection. This is not a question
courts usually want to explicitly ponder.
A third way to frame First Amendment interests is to talk about the message itself, and whether its contents reflect high
or low value speech. But as Benjamin points out, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this message-oriented
approach, at least with respect to speech made by an intentional speaker.
A fourth way to frame First Amendment interests is to look at the broader communications environment, including the
listeners, readers, and receivers of communication. And this approach highlights a problem with both Benjamin’s and
Boyden’s potential exclusion of algorithmic speech once a human is no longer involved in the selection of a message.
Even an autonomous Tolstoy Bot would still be creating works that appear to readers to be identical to speech by
humans. At that future phase of algorithmic creativity, censorship of Tolstoy Bot would affect readers the same way as
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censorship of Tolstoy: they would have access to less information, and would perceive the government’s actions as
censorship. Under multiple theories of the First Amendment, this kind of censorship would raise problems—even if there
is no human meaningfully involved in the crafting of the substantive message listeners could receive.
The article’s focus on a speaker’s agency as the touchstone of First Amendment protection thus may in practice
prove to be both too inclusive—including actions as speech merely because a speaker claims to have a substantive
message—and too underinclusive—rejecting speech that clearly looks like speech to a reader. The speaker’s agency
approach may be most consistent with current jurisprudence, but the more difficult question for a future article is
whether it is the right approach to future technologies, and why.
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